So, if you’re like me, you’ve probably already read the International Opportunity Crisis Group’s brief on the situation in Myanmar (link for those who haven’t).
Obviously, the situation there is bad. And, due to restrictions on the foreign media, its not getting much airplay or articles devoted to it. I think even I’ve only mentioned it once, in the passing, which is bad of me, since I’ve seen the reports but always gone “maybe later”.
But it seems to me that the junta has made a serious mistake here, in a strategic sense. Although the Chinese government can be hyperbolic in defense of its sovereignty from mean and nasty human rights organisations, it is a principle they seem to take somewhat seriously. So long as a country does not threaten their interests, the Chinese are quite content for whatever regime they have to continue on as it has before, an attitude some might suggest we share with them, when it suits our interests.
But I’m digressing. The thing is, one thing that the Chinese government does not like is floods of refugees. In fact, one of the more plausible explanations for Chinese support of North Korea is the fear that without the aid China gives it, the government would collapse and even more North Koreans would attempt to cross the border into China. And if you’re fleeing towards China, that says a lot about how bad the regime you are running from actually is.
So. But China has other interests in Burma too, interests that force it towards supporting the junta. So naturally, China is in a bit of a bind, especially when you throw in the ethnic calculations on this.
So where is the opportunity? Well, China would clearly love a resolution to this crisis. China has a balance of influence thay likely able to force changes in Myanmar’s policy, they have the geographic closeness as well as the military, economic and political links that can bring pressure to bear upon the junta. But at the same time, there is fear that hasty action could threaten what China has in the increasingly insular and erratic state. And furthermore, as the article points out, the junta has been reaching out to states like Russia, Malaysia and India to balance against that Chinese influence (indeed, my argument that China has such a level of influence is born out of the attempts of the junta to not be in thrall to Chinese geopolitical ambitions).
But these allies of Myanmar are not exactly the best of friends. India, for example, was denied access to gas from the Shwe field pipeline, which is due to open in 2010, and will exclusively help China in its quest for more access to the world’s energy resources (another one of those issues complicating their relationship with the junta). Russia is trying to pull a “Sparta” in world affairs, a theme I will expand upon later, and so is offering help to any regime which is non-democratic and not loved by America, there is no deep and meaningful significance to their relationship. And North Korea…well, international pariahs tend to stick together, out of necessity more than choice. Not to mention the DPRK isn’t exactly influential on the world stage, attention-gaining antics aside.
To put it more bluntly, the junta’s allies are fair-weather friends, who given the right incentives, could abandon the support they provide to it currently. Gas for India, maybe arms deals for Russia and something for North Korea to shriek about later on, when it feels the world isn’t paying it enough attention. But that’s speculation, no doubt the government’s in question are already calculating what it would take for their alleigance to switch.
And China too, has friends in this. Western governments, eager to rehabilitate their stained reputations from the War on Terror and abandonement of human rights in pursuit of this, would no doubt like to help bring about a democratic and free Myanmar, if for no other reason than to have an example of their benevolence to silence internal and external critics. Failing that, selfless attempts to intervene in a humanitarian crisis will do.
First this is a good way for Western powers to work with China in a multi-lateral fashion, involving the UN and ASEAN, as suggested by the International Crisis Group. Now is an especially good time, since there is a debate in ASEAN about having a human rights enforcement capacity, and while Myanmar is opposed to this, its reasons for being so will look even more self-serving, in the current political climate. Also getting China to work more with international bodies is a good idea generally, since China does not work with such organisations much, outside of the UN and certain economic forums like the G20 (this is partly due to the realist suspicion of international institutions that permeates Chinese foreign policy, and I believe partly a hangover from their years in the Non-aligned movement). While engagement without reservation has its down sides, edging China into a more pro-active role in a humanitarian crisis would seem to me to have few negative implications, and ensnaring it into a more active collaboration with ASEAN may have some effects on its horrendous internal policies too.
Secondly, and far more cynically, as astute readers will have noted, China and Russia are both members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with India as an observer. Given their potential for disagreement over this issue, even if it is somewhat forced due to the reasons I have outlined, this might throw a spanner into the relationship between China, India and Russia, and so the workings of the SCO. Very speculative, I know, but some people in America and Europe consider the SCO an anti-NATO alliance, despite its protestations otherwise, and ruining the burgeoning cooperation between China and Russia and potentially India could be appealing.
Anyway, regional and geopolitical manouvering aside, lets hope something can be done to resolve the crisis. The Burmese junta seem to have gotten away with far too much lately.
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